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ABSTRACT 
Control of the U.S. border is a primary concern for the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Three of the department’s components have major roles in providing border 
security and control.  With increasing costs and constantly changing threats, it is vital that 
all border organizations work together collaboratively. This thesis looks at two new ideas, 
border regionalization and joint regional border commands, and compares them with 
current efforts to increase collaboration.  By establishing border regions, DHS can use 
threat based planning in each region to allow all border control components to focus on 
threats specific to their region while also increasing the level effectiveness of resources. 
Joint regional border commands offer even greater advantages in collaboration between 
components and resource usage. The DoD model for regional combatant commands is 
used as an example of how DHS can take advantage of the lessons learned with this 
recommendation.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for protecting the 
U.S. from all hazards that threaten the safety, health, and well-being of its citizens in the 
homeland.  Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, preventing terrorists, the acts of terrorism, 
and the tools of terrorism from entering the U.S. has become a priority.  But other threats, 
such as illegal immigration, smuggling of narcotics, and other criminal activity 
originating outside the U.S. also remains high priorities.  The main prevention activities 
for the U.S. homeland are conducted at and around the U.S. border and ports of entry.  
Though the U.S. border can be defined in many ways, depending on the environment 
(e.g., sea, land, air) and what laws (e.g., local, state, federal) are being enforced, the 
border is essentially the point where people and/or cargo cross from the jurisdiction of a 
foreign nation or international waters/airspace into the jurisdiction of the U.S.  In the first 
five years of the department’s existence, border security has been one of its highest 
priorities.  The DHS components most responsible for border security, Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), have struggled to define, coordinate, and have a common strategy for 
border control.  Even within CBP, Border Patrol, Office of Field Operations (ports), and 
the Office of Air and Marine have struggled with developing a unified effort.   
The U.S. border is comprised of nearly 20,000 miles of a mix of coastline and 
rugged land borders with Mexico and Canada; this includes parts of the border that run 
through a maritime environment, as is the case with much of the border with Canada on 
the Great Lakes (Beaver, 2007).  The U.S. Coast Guard counts 95,000 miles of shoreline 
that needs to be protected and monitored (Braesch, 2009, p. 1).  The U.S. border covers 
the full range of environments from maritime to desert, tropical to arctic, mountainous, 
and from thickly forested to opens plains.  The maritime environment adds the 
complexity of different borders for different purposes.  There is the 12-mile territorial 
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sea, the 12-mile contiguous zone, and the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 1 
There are three modes used for transport: land, air, and maritime. To make things even 
more complex, there are three federal agencies that share responsibility for enforcing the 
laws in these various environments at, and between, ports of entry: Customs and Border 
Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
The U.S. border also differs greatly depending on whether it is a land border or 
maritime border, and whether it is north or south.  The threats and methods used for the 
various border segments vary greatly across the border but tend to be common to some 
specific border regions.  The southwest border with Mexico is primarily a land border 
with miles of desert land where the threat of mass illegal migration and narcotics are of 
primary concern. On the other hand, the Great Lakes region on the northern border with 
Canada presents a stark contrast in geography, threat, and methods.  Though illegal 
narcotics are a concern, preventing the entry of terrorists and/or terrorist weapons is a 
major goal.  
The Coast Guard’s resources are much more prominent and intelligence plays a 
key role in focusing use of resources for the Great Lakes border control efforts.  These 
types of differences can be observed between each of the various parts of the U.S. border.  
Adding to the complexity are the differences between at-the-port and between the ports 
operations and also the differences between the three modes of transportation used at the 
border; air, land, and maritime.  
                                                 
1 The Territorial Sea is a belt of ocean space adjacent to and measured from the coastal state's baseline 
to a maximum width of 12 nautical miles (nm). Throughout the vertical and horizontal planes of the 
territorial sea, the coastal state exercises sovereign jurisdiction, subject to the right of innocent passage of 
vessels on the surface and the right of transit passage in, under, and over international straits.  The 
Contiguous Zone is a maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea that may not extend beyond 24 nm from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Within the contiguous zone, the 
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. In all other respects, the 
contiguous zone is an area subject to high seas freedom of navigation, overflight, and related freedoms, 
such as the conduct of military exercises. Generally, a state's EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles (370 km) out from its coastal baseline. The exception to this rule occurs when EEZs would overlap; 
that is, state coastal baselines are less than 400 nautical miles (740 km) apart. When an overlap occurs, it is 
up to the states to delineate the actual boundary (Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2005). 
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Yet, within DHS, the components involved with border control have tended to 
treat many border related threats as applying to the entire U.S. border equally. 
Furthermore, efforts by DHS to address risk management and performance measurement 
indicate that there is a tendency to treat the border as one problem without fully 
considering its many complexities. For example, in the U.S. Coast Guard 2008 Posture 
Statement, under the Border Security section, patrolling and protecting coast line is the 
only strategy mentioned to stop terrorism and smuggling (U.S. Coast Guard [USCG], 
2008, p. 22). There is no mention of the differences encountered on the various coasts, 
nor are there differences identified regarding the type or level of threat (e.g., on the Great 
Lakes as opposed to the Gulf Coast).   
CBP is slightly better in this regard, in that it identifies three separate strategies: 
southern border; northern border; and coastal border (U.S. Border Patrol [USBP], 2004, 
p. 15). However, the distinctions do not go far enough to highlight the differences 
between the Gulf Coast and the east and west coasts.  Two workgroups established at 
DHS, the Border Control Model Work Group (BCMWG) and the Risk Assessment 
Program for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) have worked on the assumption that 
the threats to the border are mostly uniform and have worked toward solutions that are 
simplified and do little to recognize the complexity of the border.  
One example of differences on the U.S. border can be illustrated by comparing 
the southwest land border with the land border with Canada.  On the southwest border, 
the threat of mass numbers of immigrants crossing the border is high. Since much of the 
southwest border is open desert, the strategy to use technology is employed to increase 
the ability for detection. To enable response, CBP is improving infrastructure and 
increasing the number of border agents.  In contrast, on the northern land border, 
incidents of immigrants crossing the border between ports of entry are less frequent and 
usually involve only one or two people at a time.  The strategy for that part of the border 
relies more heavily on intelligence combined with detection capability.  Increasing border 
agents to cover that part of the border would be too costly and would not be practical.  
The strategy is to make more of an effort to coordinate with other federal, state, and local 
organizations to help with response.  
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The maritime borders are also a good example of differing threat and strategy on 
the border. The Coast Guard actually defends several borders from the shoreline to the 
territorial waters, and also the Economic Enforcement Zone (200 miles out).  The 
maritime strategy involves detection at various stages so that targeted vessels are 
screened before reaching the shoreline.   
One of the problems that results from this monolithic approach is that while parts 
of the border such as the southwest land border with Mexico have garnered great amounts 
of attention and resources, other parts of the border have been left largely unaddressed.  
The buildup of infrastructure on the southwest border to gain effective control involves 
equipping nearly 2000 miles of the border with sensors and/or surveillance equipment 
and is estimated to cost anywhere from $8 billion to $30 billion  (Department of 
Homeland Security [DHS], 2005).  The threat of terrorism was a primary justification, 
but there is general agreement that the greatest threats from terrorism are not necessarily 
on the southwest border.  While the flow of illegal immigrants and smuggling continue to 
shift in location and methods on the southwest border, it remains a significant problem. In 
addition, the question needs to be asked as to whether the heavy spending of resources in 
one area in this way is justified by the results and whether the vulnerability to terrorism 
has been reduced.  There are other parts of the border that also need to be given attention 
and border areas where the U.S. should spread out the resources that it dedicates to 
border control.   
Another problem is the way that components plan and control operations and 
compete with each other for the resources to achieve their own component level plans.  
The Coast Guard has a strategy for stopping illegal drugs from coming into the country 
that is based on trying to stop smugglers before they get close to the border.  The Coast 
Guard strategy competes within DHS for resources with ICE (interior enforcement and 
external investigation and intelligence) and CBP (interdiction at and near the border) use 
competing national level strategies instead of all three components working from a 
unified strategy that truly integrates the expertise and resources of all three organizations.  
There is a tendency for components to compete to maintain control of traditional turf or 
to add to the turf they have instead of focusing on the needs for overall, improved border 
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management.  For example, when the Secure Border Initiative was being offered as a 
program to improve border security, the Coast Guard knew it would not be able to 
compete against that mandate and decided to only work within its base budget that year 
(CBP, 2006).  This illustrates how the components and DHS posture their approach to the 
resource allocation process in a way that pits program and component plans against one 
another instead of taking an integrated approach.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The proposed thesis and associated analysis will focus on addressing the 
following specific research questions. 
 What are the coordination/cooperation issues in border operations, how do 
they vary by region?  
 Would a regional approach provide a better gauge of effectiveness and 
lead to improved resource distribution for controlling the U.S. borders? 
 What should the basis be for a regional border approach? 
 Could existing models of joint military commands be applied to the U.S. 
border to create regional border commands to improve collaboration and 
effectiveness?   
C. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
The significance of the research proposed is that it addresses an issue that DHS 
continues to struggle with, but from a perspective that has not been thoroughly studied.  
The research will look at regionalization that does not just attempt to use the existing 
regional structures but used regionalization in a way that focuses the regional structure on 
operational need and specifically for one aspect—border control.  The research also looks 
at applying the concept of joint command, something that is well known in the military 
community but not common in the law enforcement or border communities.  No similar 
examples could be found during the literature review, indicating that it has not been given 
much consideration in the academic community. The planned research will broach the 
subject and hopefully stir interest and dissent that could eventually bring out various 
views on the efficacy of a regional joint command approach for law enforcement and 
other areas of public service.   
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Another contribution of this research will be the combination of regionalization 
with joint command.  Though regionalization has been considered in the past for DHS, it 
has not included the aspect of joint command.  The recommendations resulting from this 
research will help DHS and border component leadership with a proposal for improving 
overall collaboration and effectiveness for U.S. border management. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review identifies relevant sources concerning regionalization and joint 
commands, especially in relation to how those concepts can or are being considered for 
improving border control.  The sources evaluated are diverse, originating from the federal 
sector, academia, and individual experts.  Though few sources could be found that 
discuss the merits of regionalization or joint commands for border control, there are 
several that discuss the overall benefits of those approaches and some that discuss the 
idea of regionalization for DHS in general. Under regionalization, the review involves a 
look at government reports, articles, and academic writings concerning past or existing 
regionalization attempts within DHS and, specifically, regarding any reference to the use 
of regionalization for border control.  It also includes a search of literature discussing 
regionalization efforts for organizations similar to DHS dealing with law enforcement 
issues and other government organizations, such as state efforts to regionalize various 
services.  Similarly, a search was conducted under joint commands for literature dealing 
with proposed or actual attempts at using a joint command approach within DHS.  It also 
involved a review of joint command used in organizations to integrate operations of 
several subcomponents.  
1. Regionalization 
Though not specific to border control, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) discusses how federal programs often rely on regional approaches to deliver 
services more efficiently and effectively (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2004, p. 26).  The GAO goes on to say that as DHS involves more state and local 
organizations that regional structures and plans will become more important for all major 
homeland security assistance (GAO, 2004, p. 27).  Again, the focus for these arguments 
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was for disaster response and recovery, but the same arguments could be applied to any 
of the security areas addressed within DHS.  Other readings also focused on the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) role in DHS but support the GAO’s claim.   
The National Association of Development Organizations (NADO) stated in a 
2005 report: 
In a general sense, there is an intensifying dialogue at all levels of 
government about the rationale and the overwhelming benefits of working 
regionally to strengthen local planning, preparedness and prevention 
efforts. However, the reality at the grassroots level is often more complex 
as governmental entities and first responder officials fear losing control, 
seek to protect their turf, have overlapping responsibilities or simply fail to 
recognize the benefits of pursuing regional solutions. (NADO, 2005, p. 3) 
The NADO report seemed to indicate that there is a realization that regional 
approaches are seen as beneficial, but that there is significant resistance from those that 
sense they may lose control or possibly influence over what is considered as their 
domain.  In applying this idea to border control, one can see where similar challenges 
may exist in trying to implement a regional approach. This may have been one of the 
problems with past attempts at establishing regions in DHS.   
The Office of Management and Budget described how the new DHS would “put 
into place an organizational structure that meets the dual needs of centralized planning 
and decentralized execution”  (Office of Budget Management [OMB], 2003, p. 5).  This 
regional approach would put regional directors in charge of all homeland security 
missions within their assigned region. However, the regional plan was never 
implemented.  The early attempts at regionalizing DHS were centered on the organization 
existing at that time. DHS looked at how to move the existing organizational structures 
into common regions. There was much resistance from the components involved and 
confusion over these planned regions because the regions did not consider the operational 
needs of the organizations.  
Because there was not a clear definition of what a region should be, and states and 
federal organizations had different views on what regionalization would mean, there was 
little chance for those efforts succeeding.  William Austin said it best when he said, 
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“regionalization of homeland security efforts in the United States can succeed if based on 
clear definitions, solid leadership and a system that allows input into the decision making 
process from the regional level” (2006, p. 21).  The idea of regionalization in and of itself 
was not the problem, but more so how it would be defined and implemented.  Austin does 
question whether regionalization is necessary and offers no change in the current 
structure as one of the options (2006, p. 68). Ultimately, for emergency management, the 
recommendation presented by Austin reflects the need to have a regional approach but 
ensuring that the definition is clear, the leadership is solidified, and that the state and 
local organizations have input into the organization (2006, p. 74).    
Though not in the context of making an argument for regionalization, Jerry 
Kidrick and James J.F. Forest describe the unique challenges of protecting Alaska in a 
way that clearly suggests that a case can be made for regionalization as a way to solve 
those issues  (2006, p. 254). U.S. border security focuses highly on the southwest border 
with Mexico and, recently, on parts of the border with Canada. Yet, Alaska, along with 
its size and strategic location, is home to the Alaskan pipeline and the Port of Valdez, 
where 9.2 million barrels of oil is stored and 50 supertankers transit each month (Kidrick 
& Forest, 2006, p. 261).  In the current approach to border control, there is little 
opportunity to focus resources on Alaska, as it has to compete with the Mexican border 
for national attention.  Would a regional approach ensure that the Alaskan border at least 
have some consideration in the discussion for resources?  
One argument that can be made against regionalization is from the failure of DHS 
to implement a regional structure in the early stages.  Secretary Tom Ridge made 
regionalization a priority yet the resistance and lack of political support doomed the 
original idea (Glasser & Grunwald, 2005, p. 5).  However, since the initial failures there 
have been some changes that have in essence helped to regionalize some operations.  As 
an example both the Department of Defense (DoD) and DHS have assigned members in 
each of the FEMA regions for pre-coordination and planning (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], 2009). 
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2. Joint Commands 
There were no sources found that discussed the idea of joint commands for border 
control or for cross-component regions within DHS.  The concept does not seem to have 
been considered within DHS at all.  Though fusion centers, Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams (IBETS), Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), and 
other joint task forces have been employed in DHS; however, the concept is only applied 
at the tactical level of the components involved and does not employ the overall 
command concept at the strategic and planning level.  The one organization that has 
employed this concept is the Department of Defense.   
There are several sources that discuss the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that 
helped to strengthen the joint or unified command concept in DoD.  Most of the literature 
concentrates on the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays within the department in 
providing strategy and removing conflict between military services.  Faller (1991) 
discussed whether the Goldwater-Nichols Act achieved what it set out to do.  He 
concluded that though there are some areas where the act may not have gone far enough, 
it essentially set about a change in culture for the military services that over time has and 
will continue to improve.  A quote that helps frame this claim discusses the role of each 
individual in that culture change:  
It is a concept—a mindset that says, “Let’s have the best team, regardless 
of the cost to the individual service.” As one Navy commander put it, 
“your question should be, not is jointness working but, what have you 
done for jointness today?” (Faller, 1991, p. 151)   
Locher (2001) discusses several aspects of Goldwater-Nichols and the effect it 
has had on DoD and the military services.  In most areas, the author advocates that there 
has been marked improvement.  Concerning the U.S. joint warfighting capabilities, 
General Shalikashvili was quoted, “No other nation can match our ability to combine 
forces on the battlefield and fight jointly” (Locher, 2001, p. 12).  The author also gives 
the DoD a grade of “A” for structural changes leading to improved operational 
effectiveness (Locher, 2001, p. 12).  
 10
Colonel Stuart K. Archer of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) points out the many 
successes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and how it had positive impacts on the 
effectiveness of DoD. (Archer, 2009, pp. 4–9)  On improving collaboration between the 
services, he said: 
In summation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reduced the influence of 
parochial service chiefs and empowered the combatant commanders to 
demand joint cooperation. While not ridding the defense establishment of 
inter-service rivalry, the Act made a fundamental change in service 
relations that future Secretaries of Defense and progressive military 
leaders would develop and expand. (Archer, 2009, p. 8) 
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani discusses how the Joint Forces Command, started 
in 1999 (formerly the U.S. Atlantic Command), has helped to further collaboration 
between the military services and improve interoperability by working with the 
combatant commanders service chiefs and senior defense officials.  He talks about efforts 
to transform the culture in DoD by rewarding innovation and intelligent risk taking and 
how these efforts are improving DoD’s ability to adapt quickly in an environment where 
the rate of change continues to increase (Giambastiani, 2003). 
3. Conclusion 
Though there are no direct references to regionalization or joint commands for 
border control, it is clear that there is high regard for both approaches in helping to 
improve effectiveness and focus for complex issues.  The literature reviewed indicates 
that regionalization was originally expected to occur within DHS but that the emphasis of 
the early attempts may have been too much on having regions for command and control 
instead of regions that target operational needs.  This leaves open the possibility that 
regional approaches that target operational needs could be accepted.   
There is only one good example of regional joint commands that would give a 
regional focus to strategies, planning, and operations.  The literature covering the DoD 
experience is rather sparse, but it consistently points to the positive effects of the change. 
Joint commands have helped to change a very powerful culture where the military 
services competed directly for resources and control of operations. Though there is still 
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much room for improvement, the change has been positive and helped improve the level 
of effectiveness for the total military.  Though this approach has not been applied to 
civilian agencies, there seems to be great opportunity in applying this concept with 
organizations that experience similar challenges.    
E. METHOD 
1. Case Study 
This thesis looks at one case study to gauge the pros and cons of organizing U.S. 
border control components regionally and organizing to establish regional joint 
commands. The Department of Defense Unified Commands, resulting from the 
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, will be studied to see how the 
reorganization: affected the level of collaboration between the military services; impacted 
the level of operational effectiveness; affected resources in general; and affected 
leadership decision-making.  The thesis will also look at the affect the reorganization had 
on the military services themselves, including both positive and negative impacts.  The 
pre-existing situation at DoD and the military services will be compared to current DHS 
and border control related components with the intention of showing how DHS might 
expect a similar reorganization in DHS to affect its border control community and its 
level of performance. Other variables that will be studied include time and degree of 
difficulty for implementation; impact on individual members; the headquarters structure 
for overall policy and strategy (joint chiefs concept); and the change in roles for the 
military services and components.  
2. Policy Analysis  
For regionalization, the thesis assesses a centralized versus a decentralized 
approach. In this portion of the analysis, the aspect of joint commands will not be 
included but rather the focus will be on the effect a more decentralized approach would 
have on border management within DHS.  In this portion of the analysis, the thesis will 
concentrate on past attempts at regionalization, and why they may have failed and also 
discuss how a different approach to regionalization specific to border management may 
be more appealing.  
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The results of the analysis of the case study and policy analysis will be used to 
construct options and a recommendation for how DHS should proceed to improve overall 
border effectiveness and collaboration.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. CURRENT BORDER CONTROL ORGANIZATION 
1. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
CBP began as one of the newly formed organizations within the Department of 
Homeland Security on March 1, 2003.  The new agency combined customs and 
immigration functions under one organization, bringing together U.S. Border Patrol 
(USBP) from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) inspections from DOJ, and the U.S. Customs Service from the Department of 
Treasury in an attempt to create “One Face at the Border”  (Office of Inspector General, 
[OIG], 2005, p. 16) (See Figure 1).  Unlike U.S. Customs and INS, Border Patrol 
transferred into CBP as a whole organization maintaining its responsibility for border 
control between ports of entry and did not face many of the issues encountered by their 
colleagues at the ports of entry.   
For customs and immigration inspection officers the transition was much more 
challenging because the move reshuffled parts of each organization combining the 
inspections part of the two organizations together and moving the investigations part of 
both organizations into a new organization, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  
Eventually, the inspections functions from the Department of Agriculture were also 
added to the mix at CBP, to create a whole new approach at the U.S. ports of entry.  The 
resulting new organization within CBP, the Office of Field Operations, now has the 
responsibility for all port inspections combining the immigration responsibilities with the 
immigration and agriculture inspections responsibilities for CBP officers.  Blending very 
different skills, cultures, and procedures was a significant challenge for the new office.  
Those challenges were further exacerbated by the change in emphasis at the border to 
preventing terrorists and weapons of terrorism from entering the U.S. (CBP, 2005, p. 2).   
This new emphasis on preventing terrorism presented challenges regarding how 
the agency would: detect nuclear and biological weapons; detect potential terrorists; and 
all while maintaining an acceptable level of trade and travel facilitation. It also provided a 
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uniting factor for the new organization at the ports of entry.  Despite the many differences 
and challenges, the new officers could rally around a very important role in preventing 
terrorism in the U.S., and that may have been the most important factor in helping the 





Figure 1.   U.S. Customs and Border Protection (From CBPnet, 2009)
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CBP also had to deal with the loss of the investigations function moved to the 
newly formed Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  This will be addressed in more 
detail later, but the move created an institutional barrier that had the effect of reducing 
operational coordination and increasing competition (OIG, 2005, p. 3). In the original 
configuration, the air assets that were part of Customs and U.S. Border Patrol were also 
located in ICE.  However, shortly after the organizations were formed, the air assets were 
moved to CBP and a third operational office was created within CBP called Air and 
Marine.  Air and Marine now provides air assets in support of Border Patrol and port 
operations in addition to supporting ICE and joint task force operations in the Caribbean.  
In addition to defining its role within CBP, Air and Marine had the challenge of 
combining 26 different aircraft types from the various legacy organizations into an 
effective air force that also happens to be the largest law enforcement air force in the 
world.    
The three operational offices in CBP—Air and Marine, Office of Field Operations 
(ports of entry), and Border Patrol—have all been able to focus their energies on 
developing the individual roles they play in improving border control. However, one of 
the main reasons for bringing these organizations together into one agency was to be able 
present one face at the border, and CBP has struggled to actually make that happen, 
especially at the headquarters level.  The uniforms of all three operational offices are 
different.  Even Air and Marine, a new office within CBP, did not adopt either one of the 
existing uniforms but now has its own distinct look.  Internally, the three different 
uniforms help to identify the individual roles, but to the public, it can be confusing to 
have three different uniforms within an organization that purports to be “one face at the 
border.”  Though many may point to examples of increased cooperation between CBP 
components for specific field operations, at the headquarters level there is still a lack of a 
unified strategy for the three CBP offices that addresses border challenges in terms that 
apply to all three offices.  The offices still compete for resources and are reluctant to 
share information that might disadvantage them in achieving component goals and 
objectives or in obtaining resources they see essential to their plans.  
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CBP has taken steps to try to integrate the operational offices, but those efforts 
have been met with internal resistance from the operational components.  This was best 
demonstrated in attempts to develop an overall performance measure for border control 
within CBP.  The operational offices steadfastly opposed attempts to use terminology that 
was not specific to their own operations making it nearly impossible to come up with 
language that could be applied to all border operations.  Instead, CBP continues to 
struggle with describing its overall success on the border in terms that demonstrate the 
value provided to the U.S. public for the funds it receives.  This is especially noticeable 
with high cost programs such as the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), which is spending 
billions of dollars on infrastructure and technology, yet has not been able to demonstrate 
how the spending is affecting the overall level of border security or control (GAO, 2008).   
The measure that is most often used for between the ports activity by Border 
Patrol is “border miles under effective control” (ExpectMore.gov, 2007, p. 1). This 
measure, though good for determining the number of miles where the planned 
infrastructure and technology has been completed and deployed, does not help the U.S. to 
know if it actually has had an impact on reducing the flow of illegal immigrants, 
narcotics, or other contraband.  It also does not help with identifying how it increases the 
level of security against terrorism.  With CBP struggling to measure success between the 
ports of entry, it becomes even more problematic when attempts are made to include all 
border control operations.  The problem CBP has had with determining overall border 
performance measures is symptomatic of the stovepipe approach that still exists for 
border control, revealing where port and between the port operations lack integration and 
a united approach to border control.   
CBP has also taken steps towards a more integrated approach for its operational 
components through strategic planning and resource planning.  In 2007, CBP shifted its 
strategic planning efforts away from a focus on its individual programs to a singular 
agency strategic plan.  The new strategic plan (signed but unpublished)2 was the first 
                                                 
2 Though the updated CBP Strategic Plan was signed, it has not been published.  This may be due to 
the change in administration and a new Commissioner awaiting Senate approval anticipating there may be 
changes to the latest CBP strategy.  
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effort to bring Border Patrol, Office of Field Operations, and Air and Marine together 
with the CBP support offices to come up with a long-term unified strategy  (CBP, 2009). 
The planning effort not only identified a more unified approach, but also identified gaps 
that were not being addressed and helped to eliminate unnecessary redundancies.  The 
strategic planning process included an implementation effort to tie the strategic plan to 
the resource allocation process, but it never got off the ground because of internal 
resistance.  That same resistance has seemed to play into decisions not to publish the 
latest version of the plan, though it has been signed.   
The CBP Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) was 
established in 2007 to help to integrate intelligence and operations for the CBP 
operational offices in the field (Basham, 2007). Since its beginning, OIOC has been 
trying to improve integration between the operational offices within CBP but with only 
marginal success.  Anecdotal reports from field representatives indicate that collaboration 
and cooperation between operational components on the frontlines of border security are 
actually quite good, as long as the leadership supports them.  Most of the success, and 
what has been reported, are the cooperative efforts that are at the operational field level.   
What tends to stay hidden from the public is the level of competition and turf 
battles that are being fought at the headquarters and strategic levels. There has been 
continuous posturing by office leadership to increase power and control with little regard 
as to how it is preventing the best opportunities for achieving the highest levels of 
effectiveness on the U.S. border.  In October 2009, a study was started within CBP to 
determine whether the operations coordination function should stay together with 
intelligence coordination.3 Representatives from CBP operational offices have expressed 
a lack of trust in OIOC and are concerned that OIOC is trying to take over operational 
control.4 Whether there is such a specific intent or not, splitting intelligence coordination 
and operations coordination would in essence weaken the operations coordination role 
currently in OIOC and make it easier for the operational offices to maintain full 
operational control over their subordinates.  However, even if OIOC stays together, the 
                                                 
3 The CBP study was assigned verbally at an executive staff meeting. 
4 Concerns expressed are anecdotal and not documented.  
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operational control will likely continue to stay within the operational offices, with only 
minimal impact from OIOC in helping to form a truly collaborative effort at the strategic 
level.  
2. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
In addition to the role that CBP plays in providing border control two other 
organizations play major roles; U.S. Coast Guard and ICE.  Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between the DHS components. As mentioned earlier, ICE combined the 
investigations role of immigration and customs together to form the basis of the 
organization. It has at different points in its short existence also included: the air assets 
since moved to CBP; air marshals currently in the Transportation Safety Administration; 
and the Federal Protective Service recently moved to the National Protection and 
Programs Directorate (Immigrations and Customs Enforcement [ICE], 2009).   
ICE’s role for border control is much different from CBP’s in that it is not defined 
by, or only located near, the U.S. border.  ICE agents investigate all types of border 
related crimes and also support border operations through their Detention and Removal 
Program. Much of its operations are conducted away from the actual U.S. border in the 
U.S. interior and outside of the U.S. borders, in essence providing a layered approach to 
defense of the border.  ICE investigations take their agents to all parts of the U.S. and the 
world to enforce U.S. laws related to border enforcement and to reduce the impact of 
threats such as: terrorism, narcotics, financial crimes, contraband smuggling, visa 
violations (compliance enforcement), human smuggling and trafficking, document and 
benefits fraud, intellectual property violations, crimes exploiting children, transnational 
organized crime, and gangs (ICE, 2007, pp. 2–5). With such a large amount of 
responsibility, ICE must prioritize use of its resources to target areas of highest concern.  
With ICE investigations being separated from CBP operations, CBP has had little 
influence over ICE priorities and has often been frustrated in the past to find little interest 




between CBP and ICE and the communication methods of information has often 
presented problems in connecting the two organizations on important information (OIG, 





Figure 2.   Department of Homeland Security (From DHS.gov, 2008) 
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The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the organizations that transferred to DHS as a 
whole agency. (See Figure 3.) USCG came from the Department of Transportation, and it 
has maintained its status as a military organization.  Three of the 11 USCG missions are 
related to border control: drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; and other law 
enforcement, which includes maritime security and protecting the integrity of the U.S. 
maritime borders (USCG, 2009).  Of the nearly 19,400 miles of U.S. border, 12,400 are 
in the maritime environment (Pekoske, 2007 p. 2).  Unlike the approximately 7,000 miles 
of land border, the maritime borders vary depending on the location and what laws are in 
effect.  For example, the actual U.S. border with Canada runs through the Great Lakes, 
with water on both sides of the imaginary line between the two countries.  The Great 
Lakes border is very different from the other maritime borders in that once one crosses 
the “line” on the Great Lakes the person is considered in the other country whereas along 
the ocean any of several U.S. borders runs as far as 200 miles from the shoreline out to 
sea.   
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Figure 3.   U.S. Coast Guard (From DHS.gov, 2007) 
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The territorial sea extends 12 miles from the baseline (normally the low-water 
mark closest to the shore).  The contiguous zone is a band of water extending from the 
outer edge of the territorial sea and up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline (United 
Nations, n.d. (a)).  The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends from the outer limit of 
the territorial sea to a maximum of 200 miles from the baselines of the territorial sea 
(United Nations, n.d. (b)).  In the contiguous zone, the U.S. can enforce laws pertaining 
to customs, immigration, finance, and environment and can board, search, and apprehend 
foreign vessels without first obtaining permission from the country where the vessel is 
registered (Council on Environmental Quality, 1999).  This is significant for border 
control because though the actual border may be considered the baseline, the border for 
enforcement purposes is extended in the maritime environment out 24 miles.  Though 
CBP is the lead agency for enforcing the border, the USCG is the lead organization for 
providing homeland security in the maritime domain (O’Rourke, 2006, p. 1).   
The apparent overlap of responsibility between the Coast Guard and CBP, 
particularly with Border Patrol, creates either opportunities or problems—depending on 
one’s perspective.  As has been the case with Haitian immigrants since the President 
George H.W. Bush administration, the Coast Guard has interdicted migrants at sea, 
returning them to their homeland or detaining them and depositing at the nearest non-
U.S. port without immigration processing.  If migrants are able to reach dry land before 
being apprehended, they are afforded the immigration process to determine status (Barry, 
2005). This policy has kept the Coast Guard busy in the border control arena but only on 
the water.  Any enforcement on dry land in coastal areas is left for CBP to handle in the 
current organizational setup.  The question this raises concerning CBP is what resources 
does it need especially related to marine craft to do its part of the job?   
Another issue that is raised is the use of Coast Guard resources for border control.  
Coast Guard resources are used to support 11 mission areas: search and rescue; marine 
safety; ports, waterways and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; 
defense readiness; ice operations; aids to navigation; marine environmental protection; 
living marine resources; and other law enforcement (USCG, 2008, p. 16).  Coast Guard 
resources are not dedicated solely to the border security mission and at any time can be 
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involved in other missions or even pulled away from border security for something that is 
considered a higher priority, such as search and rescue at sea. From a CBP perspective, it 
is problematic if Coast Guard resources cannot be completely relied upon to see through 
border control operations.  For instance, a Coast Guard helicopter on a border control 
mission might be redirected at anytime if needed for a rescue mission that is considered a 
higher priority but to the detriment of completing the border control mission.   
3. Border Region History 
Prior to DHS, each of the components making up the new department had distinct 
districts or regions with a rationale for why the component needed the specific breakout.  
The original intent for the new department included a common regional approach for all 
of the department’s components.  This section compares the component districts/regions 
and considers the differences as a primary reason why the original DHS regional 
approach failed.  Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs, Border Patrol, and 
Coast Guard are the primary legacy organizations compared.  Even though FEMA is not 
one of the border control organizations, it was considered for the DHS regions, 
influenced the decisions concerning regionalization, and, thus, it is included in the 
comparison.   
a. U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
The U.S. Border Patrol, one of the three offices within CBP, currently 
divides operations between 19 sectors.  Prior to 2004, when David Aguilar was appointed 
as the Border Patrol Chief (CBPnet, 2009), the sector chiefs were mostly autonomous. 
Sector chiefs frequently worked with each other to shift sector boundaries as required to 
address operational needs, such as changes in air support or changes in the flow of illegal 
smuggling traffic.  Since Chief Aguilar’s appointment to Border Patrol Chief, operations 
have been centralized and changes to sector boundaries need to be approved at the 
headquarters level.  Figure 4 shows the sector breakout in 2005, while Figure 5 shows the 
2009 version of the sector boundaries.  The Livermore sector was eliminated, and the San 
Diego, El Centro, Yuma, Marfa, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley sectors all changed 
significantly to accommodate changes in operational needs.  
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Note also that neither Alaska nor Hawaii were included as separate sectors 
or as part of any of the other existing sectors.  Border Patrol does not include those areas, 
since crossing into mainland U.S. would require using a port of entry or passing through 
Canada or the maritime environment to enter. 
 
 
Figure 4.   U.S. Border Patrol Sectors and Stations (From CBP.net, 2005) 
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Figure 5.   U.S. Border Patrol Sectors and Stations (From CBP.net. 2009) 
b. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
The U.S. Coast Guard has nine districts supporting its 11 mission areas 
(USCG, 2009). The Coast Guard district setup shown in Figure 6 reflects an emphasis on 
its maritime responsibilities including inland federal waterways such as the Great Lakes 
and the major navigable river systems.  Since no documents were found that describe the 
rationale for the district boundaries, it is assumed that operational considerations for 
setting boundaries include such things as amount of recreational and commercial traffic 
and activity, environmental considerations (frequency of maritime chemical or oil spills), 
and criminal activity such as drug smuggling in the maritime environment.  Though not 
all states have federal waterways, each state is represented in one of the districts.  Some 
states without federal waterways have Coast Guard stations for other purposes, such as 
recruiting offices, Coast Guard Auxiliary offices or the LORAN (long-range navigation) 
station in Gillette, Wyoming.     
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Figure 6.   U.S. Coast Guard Districts (From USCG.mil, 2008) 
c. U.S. Customs Districts/Field Offices 
Figure 7 depicts the approximate breakout of the CBP Field Offices across 
the U.S., and also reflects the U.S. Customs district offices prior to the move to DHS.  
The district breakouts are centered on large ports of entry and as can be seen in the 
illustration can extend across several states, as is the case with the Seattle, Portland, and 
Chicago offices.  There are also very concentrated offices such as New York and Miami 
where air and maritime ports have significantly large amounts of activity.  As is the case 
with Border Patrol sectors, there are 19 field offices.  Three field office boundaries are 
very close to the same named Border Patrol sectors: El Paso, Tucson, and Laredo. The 
boundaries for the other field offices do not approximate any border patrol sectors in size 
or location.  
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Figure 7.   Customs and Border Protection Field Offices5 (After CBP.net, 2007) 
d. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
ICE is made up of numerous programs that are aligned differently at the 
field office level. (See Figure 8.) The field office types include Detention and Removal; 
Intelligence; Investigations; Professional Responsibility; Law Enforcement Support 
Centers; and International Affairs (ICE, 2009).  
                                                 
5 The map depicting CBP Field Offices was created using a CBP map that shows Border Patrol, Air 
and Marine and Field Offices.  This depiction gives a clearer view of the boundaries though does not 
include office names. 
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Figure 8.   U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (From DHS.gov, 2007) 
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The International Affairs offices are outside of the U.S. and are not 
included as part of the regionalization.  ICE has 24 Detention and Removal field offices 
as depicted in Figure 9.  The ICE Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) number 26 and are 
very closely aligned to the Detention and Removal field offices with some exception, 
mostly in the western and southwestern states (Figure 10). ICE Offices of Investigation 
appear to be located in the same cities as the FIGs (Figure 11).  Though the illustration 
does not indicate any boundaries of the areas of responsibility for these offices, it can be 
assumed that they are closely aligned with the FIG boundaries.  Similar to CBP, the 
various ICE boundaries indicate the need or at least the desire for varying districts to 
accommodate specific operational needs.  ICE does not provide any rationalization for 
the differences, but the fact that they are different indicates enough variation between the 
programs to justify different districts.   
 
Figure 9.   ICE Detention and Removal Field Offices (From ICE, 2009) 
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Figure 10.   ICE Field Intelligence Groups (From ICE, 2009) 
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Figure 11.   ICE Offices of Investigation (From ICE, 2009) 
e. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Though FEMA is not considered one of the border control agencies, the 
original regional plan for DHS included FEMA; and, thus, it is included in this discussion 
to compare the FEMA boundaries to the DHS border agencies.  No documents could be 
found explaining the rationale for the region boundaries; however, it appears that they are 
centered on large metropolitan areas that experience similar types of natural disasters 
(Figure 12).  For example: the Atlanta Region takes the brunt of hurricane disasters; the 
Oakland Region is known for earthquakes and more recently wild fires, especially those 
near to residential areas; tornadoes in the Kansas City and Denton regions; heavy snow in 
the northern regions; and flooding from various sources in all regions.  This is a very 
simplified breakdown but provides some possible logic for the approximate boundaries.    
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Figure 12.   Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions  
(From D-STAR.com, 2009) 
B. ONGOING COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS WITHIN DHS AFFECTING 
BORDER CONTROL 
1. State and Local Fusion Centers 
One of the main challenges for the new DHS in 2003 was to improve information 
sharing between the various levels of organizations involved with “homeland security.”  
In 2006, DHS began a nationwide Fusion Center Initiative to help with providing 
information, people, technology, and other resources to various centers across the country 
in an effort to create a “web of interconnected information nodes” that would bridge 
state, local, and federal organizations for information sharing (OIG, 2008, pp. 3–6).  
Though this effort was not specific to border control, it should not be left out of the 
discussion, as it is one of the endeavors to increase collaboration in law enforcement, 
including those for border control.  There has been much discussion about the value and 
effectiveness of fusion centers; however, this discussion is not about the merits of fusion 
centers, but rather what role they play in helping to improve collaboration between border 
control organizations.       
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State and local fusion centers are key elements to helping DHS to share 
information and to link information that can help identify and make visible otherwise 
imperceptible threats.  The sharing of information across the federal sector, as well as 
with state and local law enforcement organizations, is intended to help all organizations 
involved to have a better view of the whole picture as opposed to only having individual 
parts of the picture (Straw, 2009, p. 1). Though the primary focus is for organizations to 
identify potential terrorism activity, the fusion centers also share information related to 
all types of crime, including cross border activities that might be related, and, therefore, 
does provide some level of collaboration for border control.  However, the collaboration 
at the fusion centers does little to help the federal level border organizations to 
collaborate from an operational perspective because of the specific information sharing 
focus.  Fusion centers are also state run and each is managed differently.  Because 
individual states operate the fusion centers, no two are the same (Harwood, 2009). 
2. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) 
IBETs, a collaborative border operations concept developed with Canada in 1996, 
was originally organized to combat illegal smuggling and immigration between Blaine, 
Washington and British Columbia, Canada  (TechBeat, 2002, p.1).  The IBETs 
operations were so successful—seizing an average of $1 million worth of drugs, 
weapons, alcohol, tobacco, and vehicles per month—that it led to the formation of six 
more IBETS across the northern border (TechBeat, 2002, p.1).  IBETS now cover 15 
regions across the northern border and combine CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).  In 
addition, the IBETs include state and local organizations, which further enhances 
information sharing and the coordination of operations.  
From all accounts researched, the IBETs have been very successful and are 
models for international border collaboration for security operations.  The IBETs 
formalized a working relationship on the northern border between law enforcement 
agencies that existed on the operational level far earlier but lacked the resources and 
support from higher levels in organizations.  The IBETs gave the organizations the 
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resources and infrastructure needed to make the relationships between the agencies part 
of the law enforcement routine for planning and conducting operations and for sharing 
information.  This became even more important after 9/11 when information sharing 
related to terrorism became a primary concern and gave the use of IBETs a boost of 
support and further expansion.  IBETs are now being considered for use on the southwest 
border with Mexico to help combat the problems with cross border violence and stem the 
flow of illegal immigrants and drugs (The California Institute for Federal Policy 
Research, 2009, p. 1).    
Though IBETs have proven successful for coordinating some operations, there are 
significant limitations that prevent them from being the ultimate answer for border 
coordination and collaboration. So far, the use of IBETs has proven successful on the 
northern border with Canada and in an international context, which accounts for 
approximately one fifth of the border.  IBETs are being considered for implementation on 
the southwest border with Mexico.  However, the relationship between the U.S. and 
Mexican border agencies is not the same as the relationship between the U.S. and 
Canadian border agencies. Therefore, there are no guarantees that IBETs will experience 
the same level of success on the southwest border as they have on the northern border 
with Canada.  The maritime borders of the U.S. account for more than two thirds of the 
border and, as discussed earlier, are very complex.  Though some of the concepts 
developed in the IBETs may be very valuable for coordinating maritime operations, there 
may be significant differences other than just lacking the international component.  
Lastly, and, most importantly, though the IBETs have been great for coordinating at the 
operational level, component representatives are still subject to component control.  Each 
component maintains its own strategic initiatives, control of resources, priorities, and 
competitive spirit that keeps the IBETs from being anything more than a way to have 
everyone in the room coordinated on information and operations.  From a strategic 
standpoint, the components and not the IBETs decide what the priorities are, how 
resources will be utilized, how to participate in, and whether to support specific 
operations.  The success of the IBETs is totally dependent on the willingness of the 
components to participate and share and can shift at any time depending on the situation.   
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3. Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) 
ICE began establishing BESTs in 2005 to help counter significant increases in 
border crimes and violence along the southwest border, especially in Texas (ICE, 2008).  
Though the primary functions of ICE are related to investigations and intelligence and 
not as first responders, ICE has provided direct operational support to first responders 
through its BEST offices (Ayala, 2009, p. 4). Rather than planning and coordinating law 
enforcement operations as the IBETs do, the BESTs focus on sharing intelligence and 
information between organizations that can then be used to support operations.  The 
BESTs established on the northern border have “complemented and increased the 
effectiveness” of the IBETS through its investigative abilities (Ahern, 2009, p. 5). Like 
IBETs, BESTs bring together a large number of federal, state, local, and international 
organizations including CBP, Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Social 
Security, FBI, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and IRS.  Internationally, 
RCMP, CBSA, and other state and local organizations from Canada have participated; 
there has also been involvement from the Mexican law enforcement agency, Secretaria de 
Seguridad Publica (SSP) on the southwest border (CBP, 2009; ICE, 2009, p. 5).  Under 
the new administration, DHS has committed to double the number of ICE agents assigned 
to the Violent Criminal Alien Sections (VCAS) located in the five southwest Border 
Field Offices; a testimony to the high level of effectiveness that they have brought to 
border control efforts (California Institute for Federal Policy Research, 2009, p. 1). 
Similar to the IBETs, the ICE BESTs have had a positive impact on the level of 
cooperation and information sharing, but they also share the same characteristics relating 
to component control and a lack of unified strategy.  Also, since it is not an organization 
geared toward coordinating operations, but rather one to share and coordinate 
intelligence, it relies on the whims of the participating organizations to voluntarily share 
and contribute.   
4. Joint Task Force 
In addition to the IBETs and BESTs, DHS components participate in several other 
joint task force operations such as the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the Organized 
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Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), and the Document and Benefit Fraud 
Task Forces.  The JTTF, run by the FBI, and OCDETF, run by the DEA, are both 
Department of Justice efforts that DHS components support and for which they provide 
participants.  These task forces are run similarly to the DHS IBETs and BESTs in that 
participation is mostly voluntary and the task forces provide forums where participants 
are able to share information and intelligence and also coordinate activities related to the 
focus of the task force. The component members of the task force maintain their own 
strategies and participate, as long as it provides an overall benefit to the priorities of their 
component.  From a comparison standpoint, the task force examples do not provide 
anything different from the IBETs or BESTs as a model to follow for improving border 
control collaboration, other than that they provide more examples of the ability, at the 
tactical level, for law enforcement agencies to work together to improve effectiveness.  
C. CURRENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO BORDER 
CONTROL COLLABORATION  
With all of the success and improvement gained by the various task forces within 
DHS, one might question whether there is any need for changing the current approach.  It 
is obvious from the research that IBETs and BESTs have had positive effects on 
interdiction efforts and on formalizing the high level of cooperation that has been 
experienced at the tactical level.  What is not obvious to the casual observer is the high 
level of competition and battles over turf that continues at the headquarters level, 
especially within the DHS and, in the case of CBP, within the component.  Part of the 
blame for that competition can be put on the resource allocation process since it forces 
components to partake in a win/lose process that does not reward organizations for saving 
money or reducing their scope of responsibility.  Regardless, DHS components involved 
with border management continue to compete for control instead of committing to 
changes that would achieve the most effective ways to use the expertise and resources 
across the components for improved border control.    
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1. Competition 
There are numerous examples of the level of competition especially between the 
law enforcement components within DHS. Some might point out the value of 
competition in that it helps the components to continuously improve and to perform at 
high levels.  DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff’s Second Stage Review (2SR) included a 
study of the law enforcement issues within DHS.  Though not publicized, it was well 
known among the 2SR study teams that the law enforcement team was the most 
contentious of the 19 issues teams and found that the participating members were not able 
to come to agreement on some the more difficult concerns during the study.  Many of the 
problems stemmed from: differences in the cultures between the various law enforcement 
agencies; agents versus officer status; and sharing of law enforcement information that is 
considered too sensitive and might jeopardize other operations or the ability to prosecute 
a case. The members of the law enforcement issue team also included very strong 
personalities and participants who were charged with protecting their respective agencies’ 
interests during the study.   
Within CBP, the three operational offices: Border Patrol, Office of Field 
Operations, and Air and Marine have improved the level of cooperation and collaboration 
between the offices. However, there is a lingering lack of trust that keeps the any one 
office from “giving in” to another office on any contentious issue; or on an issue that 
might give the perception of another office having control over the first office’s 
resources; or that the another office may get more credit for success.  The same kind of 
competition exists between the other DHS law enforcement components as well, in a 
large part because resources that are slated to for one agency are often designated at the 
expense the others.  This was especially evident with the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) 
funds that were prioritized for infrastructure and technology on the southwest border.  
When those funds were being pursued by CBP, the Coast Guard made a decision not to 
ask for more funds above their base funding because they knew they would not be able to 
compete against SBI to get any new money for priority projects.   
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2. Component Centered Strategies 
A second issue with the current approach is that even with improved operational 
coordination, the components still maintain separate national level strategies that do not 
necessarily have the same priorities or focus.  For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard strategy 
for dealing with border control issues, such as immigration and drugs, is focused on 
interdiction prior to reaching the shoreline, and in the case for drugs, to intercept vessels 
before they reach U.S waters when possible (USCG, 2008, p. 16). Though this strategy 
has been used successfully to increase the amount of interdicted drugs targeted for the 
U.S from South and Central America, it does not necessarily translate into overall success 
since it does not account for what drugs are being transported over land or through the 
air.  However, since the border agencies tend to receive recognition for the amount of 
drugs they interdict or the number of arrests they make, the emphasis is on the 
component’s ability to effect the interdiction, regardless as of how it might or might not 
affect the image of other border agencies. This is not just how the Coast Guard operates; 
all of the border law enforcement agencies are fighting for the same recognition, to be 
able to support their own component agendas, meet component performance targets so 
that they improve their chances for getting the necessary resources.  
The strategies of each of the components also tend to deal with the border very 
differently.  The Border Patrol focuses between ports of entry with most of its resources 
going to the southwest land border and the northern border with Canada a distant second.  
The Office of Field Operations focuses on all ports of entry: land, maritime, and air.  Air 
and Marine monitors air incursions across the border and also supports JTTF operations 
in the Caribbean. As discussed earlier, the U.S. Coast Guard focuses on intercepting 
drugs and illegal immigrants as far from the shoreline as possible but does not operate on 
the shore itself.  Its resources are highly concentrated in the Caribbean and off the South 
American and Central American coastlines.  The Coast Guard is also very active on the 
Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and at maritime ports of entry.  ICE investigates 
border violations but is also very involved with crimes and immigration violations inside 
the U.S. borders.  ICE also works outside the U.S. borders conducting investigations and 
intelligence efforts to resolve and prevent border crimes.  Though the components do 
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make efforts to coordinate operations at the tactical level, the coordination mostly 
happens after the component strategies have already been developed with different areas 
of emphasis and focusing on different goals.   
To use an analogy, it would be like having U.S. football, rugby, Canadian 
football, and Australian football members forming a team and with each style of players 
having their own coaches on the sidelines. Each of them would be trying to win the 
football game but they would be using their own strategies and rules.  Team members 
might be working hard to coordinate with the other players on the field, but they would 
all be playing a different game even though they are supposedly working together to 
achieve a common goal of winning the game. The players on the field might get along 
well and try to modify their play, but when their individual sideline coaches, who by the 
way are not working together, give them direction, it keeps them from fully cooperating 
to reach an undefined overall goal.  Even getting the coaches to agree on the definition of 
winning would be difficult if the coaches are not willing to give in and modify parts of 
their game.  
3. Duplication 
With each component pursuing its own strategy, it also creates the opportunity for 
duplication.  One of the primary examples is the duplication of maritime and air 
resources between CBP and the U.S. Coast Guard.  There is a definite need for both sets 
of resources for each organization, but there has been a growing need for both 
organizations having duplicate resources in and around the same environments. As a 
result of the two organizations having different priorities, situations have come up [or 
been created] where one organization, CBP, feels it cannot completely rely on the air and 
maritime resources of the Coast Guard because the Coast Guard resources can often be 
diverted from border operations for higher priority Coast Guard missions, especially 
search and rescue  (GAO, 2005). Because CBP does not want to deal with those types of 
diversions, it continues to pursue employing its own boats and aircraft to conduct 
operations in some of the same areas where the Coast Guard already operates.  There may 
actually be some positives in having duplicate resources. Duplication may allow for 
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increased levels and quality of operations; however, it also can contribute to the level of 
competition, especially if one organization sees the other organization being recognized 
for accomplishments in an environment where the first organization believes it should 
have control.  
Another example of duplication involves the investigations responsibility of ICE.  
The DHS OIG reported that when investigations (ICE) for the immigration and customs 
functions was separated away from the inspectors (CBP), it also caused a split in the 
relationship between the investigators and inspectors in a way that gave inspectors less 
influence over what ICE would investigate. It also caused CBP to refer cases to other 
agencies and even to pursue its own investigative capability (OIG, 2005, p. 12).  Though 
this example is much more an organizational issue, it does show how having two separate 
chains of command and two different strategies tends to promote duplication of capability 
and effort.   
4. Lack of Flexibility 
Flexibility may not be the right term for describing the ability to account for 
threats to border security across the entire border, but there are large segments of the 
border that lack attention to potential threats and existing vulnerabilities. There is little 
opportunity for those segments of the border other than the northern and southern borders 
to compete with established priorities.  Overall security is weakened if we fail to identify 
the threats and vulnerabilities across the entire border and fail to allow all parts of the 
U.S. border to be considered when determining priorities for border control.  In the 
current competitive environment, the border agencies must clearly identify focused 
strategies to be able to convince the leadership that the proposed programs and projects 
will have the greatest impact on reducing the risk to identified threats.  In the current 
approach, most threats are projected across the entire border, such as a threat of nuclear 
weapons being brought across the border. With this example, one can see why nuclear 
and radiation detection capability is being sought for all aspects of border control.  
However, the threat of nuclear or radiological weapons being smuggled into the country 
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is not the same on all parts of the border. Similarly, violent border crimes experienced on 
the southwest border do not apply to the entire U.S. border.   
While billions of dollars have been poured into resources and infrastructure for 
controlling the southwest border; continuing the drug interdiction efforts in the southeast 
and Caribbean; and in recent years to the northern border, there is little evidence that 
more than half of the U.S. border is being given much consideration.  What threats exist 
along the Alaskan and Hawaiian border areas?  Are vulnerabilities on the west and east 
coastal areas being adequately addressed?  One lesson from 9/11 that needs to be 
continuously reviewed is that the terrorists took advantage of something nobody 
expected.  As the DHS border agencies focus all of their attention and resources on the 
high traffic areas, they must also be sure that al Qaida or other terrorist groups are not 
quietly taking advantage of a lack of attention.  How can the U.S. be sure that the more 
remote border areas are being adequately considered?   Is there a better way?       
5. Performance Measurement 
With billions of dollars being spent on the border for infrastructure, technology, 
and more than doubling the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, questions remain as to just 
what those dollars have bought in terms of overall security and effectiveness.  With the 
economic downturn and an accompanying movement of illegal immigrants back home 
(Bazar 2007), there are questions as to whether any data reflecting improvements are a 
result of the improvements that were bought or whether they are due to reduced threat.  
At the same time, increases in border violence and new methods being used by smugglers 
might suggest that things have actually deteriorated.  DHS has also struggled with how to 
measure border effectiveness.  Though border control organizations can provide data on 
what has been interdicted, it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount attempted 
to be smuggled into the U.S or how much actually makes it through. The DHS Border 
Control Model Workgroup was formed to attempt to come up with a border measure that 
would help inform on overall effectiveness.  It was found that the many variables across 
the entire U.S. border made measurement too difficult to define for the entire border.  
DHS continues to try to find a measurement process that will help to give an accurate 
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picture of effectiveness.  With threats that are fluid and ever adapting, the measurement 
process must be able to be based on common areas where any adaptations can be 
included in the overall level of activity. 
6. Conclusion 
In summary, border control presents incredible challenges for DHS.  Not only is 
the border environment extraordinarily diverse, but the organizations involved in border 
control bringing strong cultures that set the stage for competition.  These conditions are 
not conducive to cooperation and collaboration as it is desired by the department.  DHS 
must look at ways to overcome the obstacles of the past and pave new roads to the future.    
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III. IMPROVING BORDER COLLABORATION AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
A. UNIFIED REGIONAL APPROACH FOR IMPROVED BORDER 
MANAGEMENT 
1. A Case for Regions as a Way of Improving Collaboration and 
Cooperation  
The term collaboration has been used extensively within DHS as a primary 
method for how organizations can and should improve effectiveness and share 
information.  But what exactly is collaboration in DHS?  Eugene Bardach simply defines 
collaboration as any joint activity by two or more agencies intended to increase pubic 
value by working together rather than separately (Bardach, 1998, p. 8).  Raymond L. Kay 
II looked at this more deeply when he addressed this question in his thesis titled: 
“Homeland Security Collaboration: Catchphrase or Preeminent Organizational 
Construct?”  (Kay, 2009).  Though Kay’s discussion is primarily centered on state and 
local organizations and is mostly in the preparedness and emergency management 
contexts, he makes a number of points that address collaboration generally. These points 
can be used for federal level border control as well.  Kay points out that the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (NPG), published in 2007, describes collaboration as 
“Standardized structures and processes for regional collaboration enable entities 
collectively to manage and coordinate activities for operations and preparedness 
consistently and effectively.” (DHS, 2007; Kay, 2009, p 2). The definition is used 
specifically for the preparedness context, but it is important to note that the definition 
itself contains the idea of “regional collaboration” for managing consistently and 
effectively.  The NPG goes on to say that the objective for expanding regional 
collaboration is for “Standardized structures and processes for regional collaboration…” 
(DHS, 2007; Kay, 2009, p. 8).  This gives credence to the idea that for collaboration to 
have positive results and lead to improved effectiveness, there needs to be a standard 
approach across the participating organizations both structurally and in the processes 
being used.  Wendy Wheeler also discusses various forms of cooperation and sharing in 
terms of levels.  She identifies the fifth level, collaboration, as “characterized by highly 
 46
structured and explicit systems, commitments, decision-making structures and intended 
outcomes supported by written agreements and defined accountability for interdependent 
outcomes and results” (Kay, 2009, p. 23; Wheeler, 2007). Can this description of 
collaboration be applied to the current organizations where task force, IBETs, BEST, or 
fusion centers are being used by DHS components as the best examples of collaboration 
for border control?   
The literature reviewed seems to indicate that collaboration and regional 
approaches pretty much go hand in hand.  The NPG stated, “There is no greater necessity 
than to collaborate on a regional basis to leverage expertise, share specialized assets, 
enhance capacity, and interoperate cohesively and effectively”  (DHS, 2007, p. 19).  
Additionally, it goes on to advocate that all levels of government must embrace a 
regional approach to improving capabilities (DHS, 2007, p. 20).  Susan Reinertson, in her 
thesis titled Resource Sharing: Building Collaboration for Regionalization, said:  
A regional approach will deliver a more comprehensive needs and risk 
assessment as opposed to a myopic analysis limited by jurisdictional 
boundaries. This leads responders to realistically perceive funding 
priorities. Regionalization is pivotal in developing a comprehensive 
homeland security program strategy that incorporates both prevention and 
response.  (Reinertson, 2005, p. 31)  
She also said, “Regionalization can be interpreted as a force-multiplier that 
delivers economy of scale” (Reinertson, 2005, p. 32).  The GAO maintains that regional 
approaches are recognized as one of the key ways to address terrorism (GAO, 2004, p. 1).  
The GAO also said explained:  
...effective regional collaboration is characterized by, among other things; 
the presence of a regional organization of many diverse stakeholders that 
identifies problems and possible solutions…The combined outcome of the 
collaboration interaction of those parties is a strategic plan that is made 
actionable by the presence of goals and objectives.  (GAO, 2004, p. 23)    
Jennie Temple, in her thesis Enhancing Regional Collaboration: Taking the Next 
Step makes the point that regional collaboration helps ensure that plans are aligned 
despite the diversity across DHS  (2007, p. 4).  When one looks at the diversity of the 
U.S. borders and the varying relationships to deal with that diversity, it seems that a 
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regional approach would help improve the degree of collaboration, especially given that 
there would likely be an improved level of consistency within each region.  
An argument could be made that the literature mainly speaks to helping to solve 
the problems by supporting states in the handling various types of disasters and for more 
efficient use of resources for response, recovery, and preparedness—not for handling 
federal level border control.  It is a point that cannot be ignored, but at the same time it 
should not be a reason for failing to considering how regionalization might help create 
improvements for border control.  If regionalization can help states to more efficiently 
use sparse resources for preparedness and disaster response, would it not make sense that 
the same approach might help the federal agencies, involved with border control, find 
ways to more efficiently use their resources?  Rather than aligning plans by component-
specified “regions” that are not congruent with the other components, would not a 
common regional approach help to ensure that the resources from all components were 
working in harmony?  Would not regional approaches help to avoid the component 
myopic views and strategies and help produce strategies that are focused on the 
challenges faced within the specific region?  Finally, if regionalization is a key to 
addressing terrorism for response, recovery, and preparedness, would it not seem logical 
that it would also benefit addressing the threat of terrorism at our borders?  Even though 
the literature is not specific to regionalization for border security, it is reasonable to 
assume that border control could benefit for many of the same reasons.   
2. DHS Regional Concept 
As described earlier in Chapter II, the existing regions6 of the DHS components 
were not compatible enough to form a single regional construct for all DHS components 
without creating major disruptions—at least not in the way that it was being proposed.  
DHS inherited agencies with very different ways of managing their operations.  For 
example, ICE and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) field offices report 
directly to their Washington headquarters offices while the Coast Guard and CBP offices 
                                                 
6 The term “region” is being used to include districts, sectors, and offices that serve similar functions 
within the component organizations. 
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report through district, sector, and area offices (Peckenpaugh, 2004). When discussing 
the varied regional boundaries, Joe Fiorill said, “The boundaries of their regional offices 
rarely coincide and former House of Representatives majority leader Dick Armey, R-
Texas, said Homeland Security’s bid to integrate the offices is likely to run up against 
“parochialism” and tenacious “civic relationships” (2004). The regions used by each 
component were largely based on operational needs and any changes to component 
boundaries would affect not only component operations but would likely affect working 
relationships with state and local partners as well.   
When comparing the regional boundaries across all the DHS border control 
components, it is easy to see the amount of misalignment, not only with the district 
borders themselves, but also with the number of regions used by the components.  
Complicating the issue further is the lack of clear purpose for any of the proposed 
regional constructs.  According to Robert Stephan, a special assistant to Tom Ridge and 
former Undersecretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection, the regional directors would 
not direct day-to-day operations but instead facilitate coordination and collaboration 
(Fiorill, 2004).  If that were the case, then it is not clear what regional directors would 
actually do or whether they would have the ability to improve collaboration.  If the 
components maintained operational control, it is likely that the regional directors would 
have little opportunity to facilitate better field coordination and collaboration in any 
meaningful way.  The component leaders would continue to hold sway over any of their 
unit operations.  It also raises questions concerning whether regional directors would be 
loyal to the region or to their own particular component.  How departing regional 
directors are treated when they return to their component would play a big part in how 
independent follow-on directors would act.  If directors or their staffs are “punished” or 
their careers are affected negatively when they return to their components, it could render 
the regional concept ineffective.  How much would members of the other components 
trust a regional director or staff members that may appear to be loyal to their own 
component?   
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After Hurricane Katrina, the focus for the proposed DHS regions became centered 
more on disaster response (Fiorill, 2006).  The emphasis was on aligning regions so that 
the various components would be better positioned to coordinate with FEMA in 
providing support and equipment during disasters.  This emphasis presented an even 
bigger hurdle for the predominant law enforcement components within DHS because it 
shifted the regional design away from law enforcement focused boundaries. 
The DHS proposal for joint regions might not have been such a bad idea except 
that the resulting regions seem to have been more focused on achieving better-centralized 
administrative control for the department rather than helping to improve collaboration 
and coordination among the component operational offices.  It appears that the biggest 
stumbling block for the DHS regions was that no one could come to agreement on a 
regional structure that would accommodate the many different operational needs of the 
components.  One of the biggest challenges in this effort remains in creating 
organizations that can accommodate the many statutory responsibilities of the 
components, including border control. The problem is that the statutory responsibilities 
and operations are so varied and diverse that it seems impossible to come up with regions 
that meet all components’ needs. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard districts are 
designed to address maritime related responsibilities of the agency, and it would not 
make sense for these components that have considerable interests and missions related to 
the land and air modes.  The FEMA regions, likewise, could not accommodate the 
operational needs of any of the other DHS components.  
But what if instead of designing regions for all operations and missions, regions 
were designed around a single mission, in this case border control.  By focusing the 
regional construct in this manner, each border region could center its planning and 
operations on the identified threats specific to that region without impacting how the 
components carry out operations and planning for other mission areas.  It would also 
allow individual border regions to determine how the components support each other in 
addressing the threat rather than trying to use centralized component policies to 
determine how component resources work together.      
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3. Proposed Border Regions 
What would border control regions likely look like if given the opportunity to 
optimally design regions for the border control mission?  Rather than trying to use any of 
the existing component regions, it seemed beneficial to consider a whole new approach 
based on what is most common when considering operational needs.  One of the first 
considerations should be the threat.  Are the threats the same for all of the border or do 
they have differences that require varying approaches?  Where does each of the threats 
pose the greatest problems?  What other factors influence response to the threat?  By 
looking at the answers to these types of questions, one can see that the U.S. border has 
enough similarities in certain areas to designate them as logical regions for border 
control.  
The U.S. border varies greatly in geography, climate, threat types, degree of 
threat, enforcement agencies involved, and political considerations.  These differences, 
though great across the entire border, can be broken down into 10 regions where the 
geography, climate, threat types, degrees of threat, enforcement agencies involved, and 
political considerations are similar.  The 10 regions are:   
1. The southwest land border with Mexico;  
2. The Caribbean/southeast coastal border (Texas to Florida/Georgia border);  
3. East Coast (maritime);  
4. Northeast land border with Canada (Maine to New York, where Lake 
Ontario begins);  
5. Great Lakes maritime and land border with Canada;  
6. Great Plains land border with Canada (Lake Superior to eastern slope of 
Rocky Mountains);  
7. Northwest land/maritime with Canada (eastern slope of Rocky Mountains 
to Pacific Ocean);  
8. West Coast (Washington, Oregon, and California coasts);  
9. Alaska maritime and land border with Canada; and  
10. Hawaii (maritime)   
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In this regional approach, illustrated in Figure 13, DHS components could 
continue to maintain their own regional organizations to support their statutory 
responsibilities and non-border related missions.  This helps to eliminate the concerns of 
the components regarding how a common regional structure affects the rest of the 
components’ responsibilities. The focus of the border regions should be on threat 
assessment, strategy, and coordinating operations between the participating components.  
Representatives on the regional staff should include members from each of the border 
components and liaisons with local and state law enforcement organizations to ensure 
that operations are also coordinated outside of federal organizations.  The main point of 
the border regions is to have staffs that can focus planning, resources and coordination 
efforts on border control for areas that have relatively homogenous threat types, levels of 
threat, climate, geography, etc.  By having component representatives co-located in 
regions to address homogenous challenges specifically related border control, the chances 
for high degrees of collaboration and coordination should greatly increase.  
 52
 
   
Figure 13.   Proposed DHS Border Regions  (After CBPnet, 2007) 
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Another feature of this approach would be that the regions would not own or 
control component resources, except for specific operations.  Instead, the components 
would continue to assign resources, including the resources requested by the regions to 
conduct specific operations.  The main function of the regions would be for developing 
and coordinating the regional strategy.  By having a joint regional staff, the level of 
collaboration on the planning and coordination efforts would increase and improve the 
degree of effectiveness.     
Though the number of regions and the regional delineations could be changed 
slightly, this regional concept demonstrates a logical breakdown of the border where 
strategies, resources, and policies could be tailored to meet the operational needs of the 
region to provide the most effective level of control and security, while also increasing 
the likelihood of collaboration and cooperation.  This regional concept provides a 
potential solution to the complexity of the U.S. border by breaking it down into nearly 
homogenous segments.  
4. How Border Regions Can Benefit from Increased Coordination and 
Collaboration 
It has been noted that field level cooperation between border control components 
within DHS has actually been pretty good whenever supported at the headquarters level.  
How could border regions improve in this area?  One of the main improvements would 
be in the area of planning.  The regional concept allows the border components to work 
together on a unified plan that addresses the threats identified for each specific region.  
Threat-based planning would focus strategies on how the various resources from the 
components would be used to counter the greatest threats to each region.  It would also 
help to ensure that component resources were coordinated in a way to ensure that the 
most appropriate resources are used for specific operations.   
This would be a distinct change from the current planning efforts where each 
component plans its strategies across the entire border and only in respect to the 
individual component’s mission(s).  For example, U.S. Border Patrol strategy focuses 
primarily on the southwest border with substantial consideration also being given to the 
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northeast and northwest corridors from Canada (USBP, 2004).  Though the Border Patrol 
also has responsibilities along the coastal borders, the best chance for getting the 
resources it desires comes from emphasizing solutions to threats in those areas.  Though 
the threats in each area are very different, the threat of terrorism is used to help justify 
requests for resources across the entire border.  
Also, in the current planning process, little consideration is given as to how other 
components impact the threat or how their resources could be used to counter the threat.  
In fact, the competition for resources actually discourages cooperation with other 
components because control of the resources for the component’s own missions is of 
primary concern.  Focusing on regional threats in a unified way would create an 
environment where it would likely decrease the level of competition between components 
and increase the level of collaboration in planning and use of resources.    
Though cooperation between components at the tactical level has been good, it 
has been based on a case-by-case basis.  In other words, component resources working 
together on operations coordinated through BESTs or IBETs tend to be single operations 
planned and coordinated as they come up.  The regional approach would bring the level 
of coordination up to a long-term and more consistent basis.  Through the joint threat-
based planning process, each of the components would have an understanding of the 
requirements and resource involvement over the whole planning period as opposed to one 
operation at a time.   
One of the characteristics of the border threats is that they are very liquid in that 
as border security features change, the threat adapts and moves to an area or method that 
attacks a perceived weakness.  The regional joint approach allows the border control 
forces to act more in unison and also adapt to the changes in the threat.  For example, if 
efforts to shutdown smuggling routes between the ports of entry begin to make it too 
difficult for smugglers whereby the number of attempts and new methods of smuggling 
through ports of entry increase, the region would be better able to coordinate resources of 
all components within the region to adapt to the new threat and more quickly respond to 
the changes.   Regionalization combined with threat-based planning within those regions 
adds a degree of flexibility not currently available for overall border control.      
 55
Regionalization by itself will not address all of the earlier stated challenges with 
how the various border organizations coordinate and collaborate to achieve the highest 
level of effectiveness.  Since the components continue to control resources, the level of 
competition and “turf wars” could still be significant enough to negatively impact the 
ability for the regions to implement their strategies.  There is also a concern that in this 
approach, regional directors would feel compelled to follow their own component’s 
direction instead of having the level of independence necessary for true collaborative 
efforts.  If that situation is allowed to exist, it could have a severe impact on the level of 
trust between the components and, again, do little to increase the level of collaboration or 
effectiveness.  
5. Comparing the Current Structure to Unified Border Regions  
W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, in their book Blue Ocean Strategy, discuss 
the importance of making competition irrelevant by looking for those opportunities to 
emphasize a product, method, service, or approach that existing “competitors” are not 
(2005).  Those opportunities when taken are called “blue ocean” strategies as opposed to 
the highly competitive approaches called “red ocean” strategies (Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005).  One of the examples of a blue ocean strategy illustrated in the book described 
how Southwest Airlines emphasized lower fares, fewer in-flight conveniences, and point-
to-point departures, to name a few strategies. This emphasis was made in order to create a 
service that was far different from the other airlines competing in the same “red ocean” 
strategy that included higher fares, many in-flight services, and few point-to-point 
departures (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 38).  Kim and Mauborgne also introduce a 
strategy canvas (2005, p. 25) that helps to illustrate the differences between the red ocean 
and blue ocean approaches, which is very useful in demonstrating how applying a 
different method can change the dynamics of a problem.   
In the case with border control, though the DHS components are not competing 
with other organizations to provide border control services, there is a high level of 
competition among the DHS border control components for resources and control.  Using 
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the strategy canvas tool introduced by Kim and Mauborgne, Figure 14 helps to show how 
the regional approach compares with the current approach using the following factors:  
1. Cost 
2. Level of Collaboration 
3. Level of Component Control 
4. Uniformity of border strategy 
5. Degree of competition for resources 
6. Degree of coordination 
7. Ability to address specific threats 
8. Efficient use of resources 
9. Performance measurement 
Strategy Canvas of DHS Unified Border Control Regions 
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As illustrated in Figure 14, the cost of the proposed border regions may be 
slightly higher considering that staff elements and support would be added in 10 regions.  
However, that cost may be offset by a more efficient use of resources, such as response 
and patrol equipment (aircraft, boats, vehicles, etc.).  Collaboration would likely increase 
substantially, though that could be influenced greatly by the amount of control exercised 
by the components over their representatives on the staffs.  Component control would 
still remain high overall, but it would be lessened in areas such as planning and 
coordinating resources.  The uniformity of strategies for the components within each 
region should improve dramatically.  Instead of component-focused strategies, the 
strategies would reflect the contributions of all components and would also include 
common goals and objectives for border control within the region.  The degree of 
competition for resources and control between DHS components would likely change 
very little since components would still determine the distribution of its resources.  The 
regional strategies would have some influence by helping to produce more targeted goals 
and objectives, but the components would still have the final word on what strategies 
would be supported.  The degree of coordination between the components should 
increase substantially since there would be a joint staff dedicated to those efforts.   
One of the areas that would be most improved through this approach would be the 
ability to better address specific threats in each region.  Though the overall ability would 
be greatly affected by the number of resources dedicated in each region, the decision-
making process would at least include comparisons of the risks faced for each region and 
ensure that all border regions are being considered. Furthermore, threat-based planning 
would greatly add to the level of coordination and flexibility for border control efforts.    
In the border regions approach, there would likely be little improvement in 
resource utilization because the components would maintain control over the resource 
distribution.  However, in the area of performance measurement, there is considerable 
opportunity to improve upon the ability to measure performance compared to the current 
approach.  In the current setup, each of the components does not segment the border the 
same way. In addition, since each of the components maintains separate strategies, there 
is no way to come up with measures that make sense across the many differences.  By 
 58
having joint strategies in focused regions, each region will be able to measure 
performance its specific goals and objectives and across all of the components involved.  
At the national level, DHS will be able to measure the level of success across each of the 
regions and be able to determine where it is meeting its goals and where it still needs 
improvement.  At the same time, it will have the information it needs to determine an 
overall status on border control across the varying threats or by location.  
Overall, the main benefits of the DHS border control regions are: improved 
collaboration; more unified and targeted strategies; the ability to address threats more 
specifically within the regions; and improved performance measurement.  Four out of the 
nine factors can be substantially improved with the other five factors having moderate to 
no positive improvement.  One of the main areas of concern that remains is the 
competition between components.  This one factor is strongly influential over many of 
the other factors, and, in some situations, it could negate improvements if taken to the 
extreme.  Component control is also a factor that weighs heavily on the ability for DHS 
to gain improvements in many of the remaining factors.  The next section will look at 
how DHS can address the remaining factors and the overall impact it could have on 
improving U.S. border control.    
B. REGIONAL JOINT COMMANDS FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS 
1. DoD: A Model for Improving Coordination and Effectiveness 
Prior to 1986, the U.S. armed forces struggled with conducting inter-service 
operations.  Military operations since World War II were hampered by conflict and 
inadequate coordination among the military services.  Service priorities trumped joint 
operations and the spirit of competition and control dominated the Department of 
Defense (DoD) (Answers.com, 2009c).  Stuart K. Archer explains:  
The command arrangements of U.S. forces in Vietnam exposed the 
extraordinary effect of service competition that had developed since World 
War II. While clinging to service prerogatives, generations of service leaders 
closely guarded service interests and countered exterior moves to increase 
effectiveness or enhance service cohesion.”  (2008, p. 12)   
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In addition, the competition after World War II between the military services 
created numerous budget difficulties as each service tried to establish its own service 
strategy as the primary solution for defense and included acquiring the resources to 
support those strategies (Answers.com, 2009a).  The National Security Act of 1947 was 
an attempt to unify the military services, but it did little to improve the level of 
coordination between the services.  The Defense Reorganization Acts were adopted in 
1953 and 1958 to further reduce obstacles to coordinate plans and management.  These 
acts also served to strengthen the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; yet these acts did little to prevent open disagreement between 
the services, and they did not help with curtailing budget requests (Answers.com, 2009b).  
The military services continued to compete for control and resources, and, in many cases, 
officers that served on or supported joint commands had their careers affected negatively 
and cut short.  
It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 (GNA) that the relationship between the armed services truly began to 
change (GNA, 1986). What was it about the GNA that was different from previous 
attempts that helped to make the transition to improved coordination happen when all 
earlier attempts failed?  Craig S. Faller credits the aspects of the act that forced the 
services to address their cultures (1991, pp. 70–78).  The U.S. Navy was probably the 
most resistant to the changes largely because it had components that matched capabilities 
of the other services and felt it had the most to lose.  General David C. Jones, USAF and 
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), described the Navy as:  
…the most strategically independent of the services—it has its own army, 
navy, and air force. 
It is the least dependent on the others. It would prefer to be given a 
mission, retain complete control over all assets, and be left alone.  (Faller, 
1991, p. 16; Jones, 1982, p. 84) 
Congressman Ike Skelton stated:   
In all honesty, it should be noted that as a service the Navy is unique. It 
has its own air force, its carrier air wings; its own ground forces, the 
Marine Corps, and of course its own warships.  (Skelton, 1985, p. 13) 
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As long as the services had the option to hold onto their culture and implement 
measures to resist, such as affecting officers promotions, the other organizational changes 
would have little chance to succeed.  By requiring joint service for promotion to flag rank 
(admirals and generals), the GNA had a significant impact on the ability for the Navy or 
any of the other services resist.  Vice Admiral M. Boorda stated, “the promotion system 
is the driver” regarding the strengthening of the joint institutions and moving the military 
organizations in that direction.  (Faller, 1991, p. 74) This is only one example of the 
cultural changes resulting from GNA, but probably one of the most important.   
Another change implemented with the GNA was the role of the service chiefs and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to operations.  Prior to GNA, the 
service chiefs and the JCS Chairman were in the chain of command for operations.  
Afterward, the JCS and service chiefs were removed from the chain of command and 
placed in the role as advisors.  The streamlined chain of command now runs from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the 
JCS and the combatant commanders were also given greater say in budget matters. 
However, even though the balance of power shifted to the joint organizations, the 
services maintained most of the power in budget (Faller, 1991, p. 72).  The role of the 
services shifted from operational control to providing trained personnel and resources to 
the combatant commands.  The services retained the ability to set policy on how their 
units were run and for assignments, but they no longer controlled planning or conduct of 
military operations.     
Looking back now, after more than 20 years, how well has the GNA worked?  
James R. Locher III conducted a detailed review of the act and its results and states that 
though there is still room for improvement in many areas, there has been marked 
improvement (2001, pp. 11–14). Of U.S. joint warfighting capabilities, General 
Shalikashvili was quoted, “No other nation can match our ability to combine forces on 
the battlefield and fight jointly” (Locher, 2001, p. 12).  The author also gives the DoD a 
grade of “A” for structural changes leading to improved operational effectiveness and 
also for establishing the combatant commanders with responsibility and authority 
(Locher, 2001, p. 12). In the area of planning, Locher was not as impressed noting that 
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though strategy formulation improved, it was not nearly strong enough and betrayed a 
strong allegiance to the past (2001, p. 13).  Archer put it as in the following:  
Today’s geographic combatant commanders wield tremendous influence 
not only within the Department of Defense (DOD), but also within larger 
governmental and interagency areas far outside of pure military affairs. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act enhanced the role of the combatant 
commanders, codified their responsibilities, and granted the authorities 
needed for effective unified command. Geographic command influence 
now transcends all areas of the military establishment, from national 
security strategy to growing influence in the acquisition process. Today, 
the geographic combatant commanders are likened to modern 
“proconsuls” and carry international status, maintain robust personal 
staffs, and can levy vast military service resources. (2008, p. 1) 
Though some have said that the GNA did not go far enough and others have said 
that there is need for improvement, there seems to be general consensus in the literature 
reviewed that the DoD has experienced mostly positive results from the GNA.  For the 
past 20-plus years, DoD has had the opportunity to see the GNA work through two wars 
in the Persian Gulf, a war in Afghanistan, military operations in Bosnia, and continuous 
threats from North Korea.  It has proven to be a solid, if not perfect, model for improving 
coordination and effectiveness.   
Could it work for DHS?  Probably not in the same way it was applied at DoD 
because of the disparate missions between the DHS components involved and the various 
law enforcement authorities.  As discussed in the regionalization section, it would be a 
stretch to think that a regional command structure could be devised that would work for 
all of the varied missions covered by DHS components.  However, if the concept was 
applied for only one mission area, border control in common border regions, there is little 
reason to doubt it could be successful.  In this construct, a joint commander would lead 
each of the border regions as described earlier.  The joint regional border commander 
would be responsible for the regional threat analysis, strategic planning to address the 
threats, and coordinating component resources to achieve a consolidated border control 
effort in the region. Unlike the border regions where the components would continue to 
direct their own component resources, the joint regional border commands would be 
given the authority to plan and direct operations within their respective regions.  There is 
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still strong support in DoD for continuing the roles of the military services in resourcing 
(Murdock & Weitz, 2005, p. 3). Similar to the DoD model, the joint regional border 
commanders would have input into the budget system and to define their own resource 
requirements. The chain of command for border control operations would run from the 
operational units to the joint regional border commander and then directly to the DHS 
Secretary.  As in the DoD model, the border control components would be bypassed.  
Another feature of this concept that would be similar to the DoD model is the 
establishment of a “joint chiefs” for border control to advise the DHS Secretary on border 
issues and to help define national priorities for border control.  The joint chiefs would 
include the chief executives from CBP, ICE, and U.S. Coast Guard, at a minimum, but 
might also include the Chief of Border Patrol, Assistant Commissioner for Office of Field 
Operations, and the chief administrator for the Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).  The component roles for border control would be to provide training, 
organizational standards and policy, and also to provide resources to the joint regional 
border commands as approved through the budget process.  Though details would be 
worked out later, generally, the components would continue to provide policy and 
guidance on procedures such as trade and processing of travelers and cargo at the ports of 
entry, but the joint regional border commanders would plan and coordinate specific 
operations and determine the use of resources for those operations within their region.   
For the Coast Guard, similar to DoD operations, units assigned to the joint 
regional border commands will be dedicated to the operations assigned.  Once the unit is 
released, it would be available to its Coast Guard command for other missions.  So for 
example, if a joint regional border commander is assigned a helicopter from the Coast 
Guard to participate in border patrol operations, it would be unavailable to the Coast 
Guard command for reassignment until released by the joint regional border command.  
The Border Patrol sectors, port field offices, and CBP Air and Marine units would come 
under the joint regional border commands operationally and under their components in 
CBP administratively.  ICE operations dealing directly with border operations would be 
coordinated through the joint regional border commands while international 
investigations and operations would continue to be handled by ICE.           
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2. Comparing Joint Regional Border Commands to Unified Border 
Regions and the Status Quo 
Figure 15 uses the strategy canvas to illustrate the comparisons between the 
options presented.  The cost of the proposed joint regional border commands would 
probably be slightly higher than both of the other two options since the staff 
commitments would probably be higher to handle operations and planning. The joint 
regional border commands are likely to find and eliminate many unseen overlaps in 
resources usage for border control efforts in areas where multiple components are 
currently operating.  The level of collaboration would more likely increase for joint 
regional border commands than it would for unified border regions. Unlike unified border 
regions, the joint commands should not be influenced by the amount of control exercised 
by the components over their representatives on the staffs because they would be more 
independent.  The uniformity of strategies for the joint commands would improve 
dramatically over both of the other two options. Because of the independence and 
authority established at the joint commands, there would be nothing to compete against.  
Instead, joint command strategies would target the threat identified for that region 
without having different, and often competing, approaches from each of the separate 
components.  
The degree of competition for resources and control between DHS components 
would change greatly under the joint commands approach.  Though components could 
still have impact on the resourcing, the joint commanders would have much greater 
influence on identifying the type and mix of resources it would need for addressing the 
threat. The components would have much less influence on determining where resources 
would ultimately go.  The degree of coordination between the components would again 
be very high and likely increase over what the border regions could provide. The joint 
commanders should have much greater influence over coordination efforts because of the 
increased authority.  The ability to address specific threats in each region would again be 
very high and probably not that much better than what could be done through the unified 
border regions.   
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Strategy Canvas of DHS Joint Regional Border Commands 
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Figure 15.   DHS Joint Regional Border Commands Strategy Canvas (After Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2005) 
As with the border regions, with the joint commands the overall ability would be 
greatly affected by the number of resources dedicated in each region. With joint 
commands, resource utilization should improve dramatically since the commands would 
have dedicated staff and resources assigned that are dedicated to specific operations. 
Performance measurement could improve considerably if each joint command can 





joint commanders would have greater authority to implement their strategies, they would 
also have greater ability to measure performance against the established goals and 
objectives.   
C. THREE BORDER CONTROL OPTIONS  
1. Status Quo 
In this option, DHS would continue to rely on the various state and local fusion 
centers, IBETS, BESTs, and joint task forces to coordinate and collaborate on border 
control.  Also with this option, DHS can expect that its components will continue to 
compete for control as well as for the resources they need to achieve their individual 
strategies. 
a. Major Features 
 Component centralized control of planning and operations 
 Component based planning 
 Component regional structures that do not align with other 
components 
 Reliance on component efforts to improve coordination and 
collaboration  
 Centralized component approaches to threat assessments 
 Component emphasis on a small number of priorities (regions) 
 Component controlled use of resources 
b. Pros 
 Components can continue to build on deeply held cultures and 
traditions 
 DHS can continue to grow and mature its organization slowly 
 Multiple component strategies to choose from to resource 
  Familiarity within components 
c. Cons 
 Component strategies that likely do not align 
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 Continued overlap of responsibilities between components 
 High level of competition between components for border control 
resources 
 Little control over the collaboration building process 
 Continued struggle with measuring border control effectiveness. 
2. Unified Border Regions  
In this option, DHS would establish unified regions for border control that would 
combine members from the DHS border control agencies into unified staffs for border 
regions that have nearly homogenous threat types, threat levels, geography, climate, law 
enforcement relationships, and international partners.  There are 10 proposed regions as 
illustrated in Figure 13. 
a. Major Features 
 Combined regional border control staffs  
 Regions that are focused solely on border control efforts 
 Coordination and collaboration of border control efforts 
accomplished at the regional level  
 Region focused threat assessments and plans 
 Threat based planning 
 All regional plans considered in budget and resourcing 
 Component controlled use of resources 
 Component control of operations. 
b. Pros 
 Threat assessments and planning that are aligned across 
components in each region 
 Uniform efforts to improve collaboration 
 Collaboration efforts that are focused on regional issues 
 Improved coordination of resources between components 
 Improved ability to measure border control effectiveness 
 Improved flexibility across component resources to adapt to 
changes in threat 
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c. Cons 
 Potential higher cost to set up regional staffs 
 Component authority and control of operations could sabotage 
collaboration efforts 
 Components competition for border control resources would still 
exist 
 Little improvement in efficiency of use of resources 
 Regional staffs lack authority and need to rely on personal abilities 
to making improvements 
 Regional staff members allegiance likely tied to home component 
3. Joint Regional Border Commands  
This option establishes command authority at the same regions described in 
option two. The component role in border control substantially changes from one of 
controlling operations to one of providing support to the regional commands. The DHS 
model for their combatant commands is used including establishing a Joint border control 
staff at the component chief level to provide advice to the DHS Secretary. 
a. Major Features 
 Joint regional border commands   
 Regions that are focused solely on border control efforts 
 Coordination and collaboration of border control efforts 
accomplished at the regional level  
 Region focused threat assessments and plans 
 Threat based planning 
 Joint regional commanders have a say in budget and resourcing 
 Regional commander controls use of resources 
 Regional commander controls planning and operations 




 Threat assessments and planning that are aligned across 
components in each region 
 Uniform efforts to improve collaboration 
 Collaboration efforts that are focused on regional issues 
 Improved coordination of resources between components 
 Vastly improved ability to measure border control effectiveness 
 More efficient use of resources across components 
 Competition for resources between components greatly reduced 
 Regional commanders have authority to implement their plans 
 Maximum level of flexibility between component resources to 
adapt to changes in threat 
c. Cons 
 Potential higher cost to set up regional staffs 
 High level of initial resistance can be expected from components  
4. Conclusion 
In summary, there are many variations that can be made to the options presented, 
but these options highlight the most likely results from three distinct approaches.  In 
many ways, the options presented mirror the phases DoD went through in helping to 
improve coordination between the military services.  In the first few years of DHS, 
billions of dollars were invested in border control infrastructure, technology, and staffing.  
The new money helped to make many badly needed improvements, but it also tended to 
hide some of the warts in the overall border control approach.  As budgets become more 
constrained, those warts will become more obvious and will need to be addressed to 
make sure that funds are being used most effectively to improve border control.     
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
All who work in elements of large organizations face a similar challenge. 
The natural impulse is to defend that element--to protect it against 
marauders, to be sure it gets its fair share, to demonstrate that its 
contributions are more vital than those of others, and, when necessary, to 
fight against its evil foes. Such impulses have their time and place, but 
increasingly, America will need officers who can resist them when the 
nation's security demands something more [emphasis added].  (Locher, 
2001, p. 14) 
A. RATIONALE 
The formation of DHS brought together many well-established organizations that 
have strong cultures and traditions.  One of the main reasons for establishing the new 
department, however, was to help break down barriers between organizations and to 
improve information sharing and provide for better integrated operations (DHS, 2002, pp. 
11–14).  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required DHS to develop a plan for 
consolidating and co-locating regional offices for its components (Meese, Carafano, & 
Weitz, 2005).  DHS attempted to meet that requirement but found that it was going to be 
much more difficult than expected.  Unlike the military services in DoD where the 
mission for each region is the same, the components within DHS have a wide range of 
missions.  The U.S. Coast Guard alone has 11 missions ranging from ports, waterways, 
and coastal security to aids to navigation (USCG, 2009). DHS found that trying to define 
regions that would be able to accommodate the well-established response and recovery 
role of FEMA and the various law enforcement organizations within the same area to be 
unacceptable to the components involved.   
Other efforts to improve coordination and collaboration have included state and 
local fusion centers, IBETs, BESTs, and joint task forces.  DHS has experienced limited 
success in improving coordination and collaboration at the tactical level through these 
efforts.  However, the type and amount of success relies mostly on the people involved.  
Another issue has to do with the lack of consistency between these various units.  There 
is no overall strategic plan that describes how these organizations fit into a national level 
effort to achieve improved coordination and collaboration.  Instead, these groups seem to 
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be established as a need occurs and do not appear to be part of a larger coordination 
effort.  These unit level coordination efforts also do little to address coordination and 
collaboration at the “regional” or component levels.   
As was noted in discussions during the DHS Secretary’s Second Stage Review, 
collaboration and coordination are mostly welcomed at the unit level.  It is at the Senior 
Executive Service (SES) level and at the headquarters where competition for resources 
and control tend to interfere with coordination efforts.  Protecting programs within 
components is a priority for many at the SES level, and coordination and collaboration is 
often supported only if it can also support program growth or at a minimum does the 
program no harm (author discussions, Culture and Internal Information Workgroup for 
the DHS Secretary’s Second Stage Review, 2005). Staying on the present course may 
continue to show some small improvements with collaboration and coordination over 
time, but those efforts will do little to address the problems experienced above the 
operational unit level.  As discussed, the real problems with coordination and 
collaboration are at much higher levels of the components.    
In the literature reviewed, there is ample support for the idea that regionalization 
would help to increase the level of coordination and collaboration.  Thus the question 
becomes “how does DHS resolve the issues with regions among its components without 
hampering their ability to support all of their missions?”  One approach that did not 
appear in the literature is to look at mission-focused regions instead of regions for whole 
components.  This idea may work for other missions also (preparedness, emergency 
response, etc.), but for this study it is only applied to the mission of border control.  
Forming regions that focus specifically on addressing parts of the U.S. border where 
threat, geography, climate, threat intensity, among other factors, are somewhat 
homogenous allows the components to work collaboratively on that mission without 
interfering with the components’ ability to continue to address their other missions with 
the organization that works best for them.  This idea takes some of the success 
demonstrated by the BESTs and IBETs and applies it to the regional level to help with 
the planning and resource coordination on a larger scale.   
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The strategy canvas (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25) helped to illustrate how the 
border-focused regions would improve coordination, collaboration, and effectiveness 
using nine factors.  The strategy canvas clearly shows that DHS could experience 
substantial increases in key areas just by establishing regions in this way.  
However, even with these improvements, the major issues of competition between 
components for resources and control are not addressed. Other areas of improvement are 
also dependent on how much control the components would yield in a regional structure 
where the components would continue to have control over operations and resourcing.  In 
an effort to find ways to gain more improvement, this study looked at the DoD 
experience with establishing its combatant commands.  What is especially interesting 
about this study is that many of the same problems currently being experienced with 
component competition and power struggles at DHS also were experienced between the 
military services at DoD.  DoD went through more than a 40-year process to try to find 
the right organizational setup that would get the military services to truly coordinate.  
DoD was at one point in the same situation as DHS where it was relying on joint task 
forces and unit level efforts to improve coordination. The military services steeped in rich 
traditions and strong cultures could not let go of their power on their own.  It was only 
through legislative action (Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986) that the military finally found a 
workable answer.     
DHS cannot adopt the DoD model outright because there are some important 
differences.  First, the military services are all focused on the same basic mission.  Taking 
the military services out of all operations and handing them over to regional combatant 
commanders was possible because the regions were singularly focused one basic mission 
(defense/power projection).  DHS does not have that ability.  As discussed earlier, the 
wide range of missions makes it nearly impossible to have a regional commander that 
could take on all of those missions successfully.  There would also be problems with law 
enforcement jurisdiction and statutory responsibilities that would prove untenable.  The 
only way that the DoD model would really work would be for singularly-focused 
missions.  The DHS regional concept described earlier fits that description.    
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Should DHS, like DoD, plod through 40 years of competition between component 
cultures until it finally finds a way to get them to work together to improve overall 
collaboration and effectiveness?  Or can it learn from the DoD experience and establish a 
command concept in a fraction of the time?  Many might argue that DHS just needs time 
to mature.  That is valid, but it can mature without making some of the same mistakes of 
the past.  Even if the joint border command process were to be pursued by DHS, it would 
not happen overnight.   
The experience that DoD had demonstrates that resistance to joint commands can 
be expected from the DHS components.  There will be plenty of efforts to demonstrate 
why component control is necessary.  Setting up the commands will take time and 
training officers to work in a joint environment will also take time.  There are two 
reasons that will always trump any other excuses: the U.S. must find ways to be more 
effective to stay ahead of the terrorist threat; and the U.S in its current economic state 
cannot afford the cost of inefficient border control.   
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The U.S. cannot afford to wait 40 years for DHS to find its way to improved 
effectiveness and coordination.  It must try to push the timetable up as quickly as feasible 
to attain the highest level of border effectiveness possible.  The DoD model presents the 
best way to achieve that goal.  DHS should take steps to establish joint regional border 
commands within the next five years. The first step is that DHS needs to determine the 
border regions.  As presented earlier, the recommended regions are: 
1. The southwest land border with Mexico;  
2. The Caribbean/southeast coastal border (Texas to Florida/Georgia border);  
3. East Coast (maritime);  
4. Northeast Land border with Canada (Maine to New York, where Lake 
Ontario begins);  
5. Great Lakes maritime and land border with Canada;  
6. Great Plains land border with Canada (Lake Superior to eastern slope of 
Rocky Mountains);  
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7. Northwest Land/Maritime with Canada (eastern slope of Rocky Mountains 
to Pacific Ocean);  
8. West Coast (Washington, Oregon, and California coasts);  
9. Alaska maritime and land border with Canada; and  
10. Hawaii (maritime)   
The map on Figure 13 gives a general idea of how the regions would be divided, 
but that would need to be vetted by the components considering what airports and 
internal ICE offices make the most sense for regional commands.  DHS also needs to 
determine how it will assign regional commanders and develop their reporting 
responsibilities. The procedures and roles for the joint border chiefs also need to be 
formulated.  The earlier these details can be worked out, the sooner joint regional 
commands can be implemented.   
A major consideration needs to be whether legislation will be needed to effect 
these changes.  The DoD model needed legislative action to overcome very powerful 
military service organizations.  DHS needs to determine how strongly the law 
enforcement components within the department would oppose these ideas and whether 
they wield enough power to prevent these changes from happening without legislative 
action.  
DHS may consider testing the joint regional command concept at one or two of 
the suggested regions before full implementation.  The Great Lakes region should be one 
of the regions in the pilot phase since it would test the workings of the maritime border 
and land border along with land ports of entry.   
Whether it is done within five years or DHS takes the 40-year route, joint regional 
border commands provide a logical answer to improving coordination and effectiveness 
on the border.   
1. Conclusion 
Border control is the only mission addressed in these recommendations; however, 
there are a number of other missions that might benefit from a similar approach.  DHS 
should consider how FEMA regions might benefit from a joint approach in dealing with 
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preparedness, response, and recovery.  During the Hurricane Katrina response and 
recovery, it was evident that resources across all of DHS, but especially the U.S. Coast 
Guard, were vastly involved. Would a regional approach help to improve upon the efforts 
to provide the kind of response and recovery needed during disasters?  DHS might also 
consider whether the Citizenship and Immigration Services and/or Transportation 
Security Administration with its overall transportation security efforts would benefit by 
being co-located with the border regions.  The airport screening, in particular, might 
benefit from being in the same region with the CBP airport personnel.  Finally, DHS 
must consider how state, locals and private enterprises can be integrated with the regional 
border control organization.  Even if true collaboration and cooperation is gained at the 
federal level through joint regional border commands, maximum border control 
effectiveness will require involvement from all entities concerned with a level of 
integration that maximizes use of inputs from all sectors.   
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